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Abstract—Federated learning, as a distributed learning that
conducts the training on the local devices without accessing to
the training data, is vulnerable to dirty-label data poisoning
adversarial attacks. We claim that the federated learning model
has to avoid those kind of adversarial attacks through filtering
out the clients that manipulate the local data. We propose a
dynamic federated learning model that dynamically discards
those adversarial clients, which allows to prevent the corruption
of the global learning model. We evaluate the dynamic discarding
of adversarial clients deploying a deep learning classification
model in a federated learning setting, and using the EMNIST
Digits and Fashion MNIST image classification datasets. Likewise,
we analyse the capacity of detecting clients with poor data
distribution and reducing the number of rounds of learning by se-
lecting the clients to aggregate. The results show that the dynamic
selection of the clients to aggregate enhances the performance of
the global learning model, discards the adversarial and poor
clients and reduces the rounds of learning.
Index Terms—Federated Learning, Deep Learning, adversarial
attacks, dynamic aggregation operator
I. INTRODUCTION
THE standard machine learning approach is built uponan algorithm that learns from a centralised data source.
Distributed machine learning proposes the distribution of the
data and elements of a learning model among several nodes
as a solution for the unceasing growing of learning model
complexity and the size of training data [1, 2]. However, the
distributed machine learning solution is neither valid for the
data privacy challenge, nor for an scenario with a large number
of clients and a non homogeneous data distribution [3].
Federated learning (FL) is a nascent machine learning
approach in which the algorithms learn from sequestered data
[4]. FL is mainly composed of two components: a global
server that owns the global learning model and a set of clients
storing the local learning models and the local training datasets.
Likewise, FL consists in: (1) training the local learning models
in each data source, (2) distilling the parameters of the local
learning models into a central server, (3) aggregating the
parameters of the local models in a federated learning model
and (4) updating the local learning models with the aggregated
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federated model after the aggregation. This specific setting
supports its main feature, which is the prevention of data
leakage and the protection of data privacy, because the data
do not abandon its local storage and they are not shared with
any other client or third party.
We know that machine learning is vulnerable to malicious
manipulations on the input data to cause incorrect classification
[5]. This vulnerability to adversarial attacks is higher in FL
because it does not have access to the training data [6]. Among
the different kind of adversarial attacks in the literature [7], in
this paper we focus on poisoning attacks [8], which are based on
the arbitrary manipulation of the training data, and specifically
on the data poisoning attack [9, 10]. These adversarial attacks
in FL are conducted by the clients because they own the data,
therefore the defence has to be performed by the FL model in
the global server.
We claim in this paper that the FL model has to be able to
dynamically avoid adversarial clients to preserve the learning
model from data poisoning attacks. In the literature there are
a number of federated aggregation operators, but they do not
prevent the federated model from this kind of attack [11, 12,
13], or they do it following some assumptions about the nature
of the adversarial clients [14].
We propose a dynamic FL model that dynamically selects
the clients to be aggregated and discards the adversarial ones.
The proposed model is agnostic about the number and nature
of the adversarial clients. The dynamic FL model is built upon
an Induced Ordered Weighted Averaging (IOWA) operator [15],
which weights the contribution of each client in the aggregation,
and it is guided by a dynamic linguistic quantifier. We call this
new FL model FL-IOWA-DQ.
We deploy in a FL setting an image deep learning classifi-
cation model for evaluating FL-IOWA-DQ. We leverage the
benchmark image classification datasets EMNIST1 Digits [16]
and Fashion MNIST2 [17], and we distribute the data over the
clients following a non independent and identically distributed
(non-IID) distribution. We show that the FL-IOWA-DQ model
is able to identify the adversarial and poor clients, filter them
out and enhance the performance of the global learning model.
In addition, one of the major handicaps of FL is the time
spent in communications between the server and the clients
[18, 19]. We show that the dynamic selection of clients of
our dynamic aggregation operator also allows to improve the
learning of the federated model, which results in (1) reducing
1https://www.nist.gov/node/1298471/emnist-dataset
2https://github.com/zalandoresearch/fashion-mnist
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2the number of rounds of learning, (2) lessening the number
of model updates among the central federated model and
the clients, and hence (3) diminishing the time spent in
communications between the server and the clients.
The rest of the work is organised as follows: the following
section summarises the background related to FL, federated
aggregation operators and adversarial attacks in FL. Section
III is focused on the description of the dynamic FL model
for identifying adversarial clients. We detail the experimental
set-up in Section IV and evaluate and analyse the results of
the FL models in Section V. Finally, conclusions are described
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
We propose in this paper a novel FL model built upon a
federated aggregation operator with the capacity of dynamically
discarding adversarial clients. Accordingly, we introduce in this
section some relevant concepts and related works. We define
FL in Section II-A, we describe the main federated aggregation
operators in the literature in Section II-B, and we introduce
the main types of adversarial attacks in Section II-C.
A. Federated Learning
FL is a nascent learning approach pushed by the need
of overcoming the limitations of distributed learning for
preserving data privacy and for processing large number of
clients following a non homogeneous data distribution [3]. FL
proposes a new training approach of learning algorithms that
consists in the iterative training of the model in the devices
that own the data, the aggregation of those models in the
federated model, and the updating of the local models with the
federated model. Accordingly, FL prevents from data leakage
and preserves data privacy, because the data do not leave the
electronic device.
Formally, FL is a distributed machine learning paradigm
consisting of a set of clients {C1, . . . , Cn} with their respective
local training data {D1, . . . , Dn}. Each of these clients Ci
has a local learning model named as LLMi represented by
the parameters {Θi, . . . ,Θn}. FL aims at learning the global
learning model represented by Θ, using the scattered data
across clients through an iterative learning process known
as round of learning. For that purpose, in each round of
learning t, each client trains its local learning model over
their local training data Dti which updates the local parameters
Θti to Θˆ
t
i. Subsequently, the global parameters Θ are computed
aggregating the trained local parameters {Θˆt1, . . . , Θˆtn} using
an specific federated aggregation operator ∆:
Θt = ∆(Θˆt1, Θˆ
t
2, . . . , Θˆ
t
n) (1)
After the aggregation of the parameters in the global
learning model, the local learning models are updated with the
aggregated parameters:
Θt+1i ← Θt, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (2)
The updates among the clients and the server are repeated as
much as needed for the learning process. Thus, the final value
of Θ will sum up the knowledge sequestered in the clients.
As a new learning paradigm, there are some works that
attempt to adapt standard learning techniques to a FL environ-
ment. Multi-task learning is one of the possible applications
of FL, where each electronic device can perform a different
task, and its first adaptation to FL is described in [20]. Recom-
mendation systems are also susceptible to be implemented in
a FL environment as is described in [21]. Domain adaptation
is related to concept of model generalisation, which is also
consider in [22] for FL. Likewise, in [23] the authors state the
security challenges that have to face up FL.
B. Related works about federated aggregation operators
One of the main elements of FL is the federated aggregation
operator, which has to: (1) assure a right aggregation of the local
models in order to optimise the learning process; (2) reduce
the number of communication rounds among the clients and
the federated server and (3) be robust against malicious clients
and clients with poor data.
There are some federated aggregation operators in the
literature:
• FedAvg [11] builds the federated model by averaging the
parameters of the local models. FedAvg was used for
improving the prediction of terms [24], recognising out-
of-vocabulary words [25] and for generating personalised
language models [26]. There is a weighted version
which consists of weighting each client according to the
proportion of data to the total data population it owns.
• Federated Stochastic Variance Reduced Gradient (FSVRG)
[12] is a modification of FedAvg to work with sparse data.
It consists on computing the gradient of each client step
by step using a full gradient previously computed by
averaging the full gradient of each client.
• CO-OP [13] is designed for asynchronous model updates
in contrast to the previous two operators. It merges any
received client model with the global model. Instead of
directly averaging the models, the merging between a
local model and the global model is carried out using a
weighting scheme based on a measure of the difference
in the age of the models. This is motivated by the fact
that in an asynchronous framework, some clients will be
trained on obsolete models while others will be trained
on more up-to-date models.
• Bayesian learning may be also used for aggregating the
local models in the global server [27].
• The adaptation of some machine learning algorithms
requires some ad-hoc procedures. For instance, an ad-hoc
federated aggregation operator for the federated version
of the k-means algorithm is described in [28].
The performance of the FL model depends on the federated
aggregation operator, because it aggregates the local learning
models from the clients. Likewise, since it works with the
parameters of the local learning models, it has to safeguard
the FL from adversarial attacks.
C. Related works about adversarial attacks
FL is highly vulnerable to attacks against the learning
models, because of its distributed scheme in different nodes.
3The main difference with classical attacks on both centralised
and distributed training models is that the FL is susceptible
to receive attacks during training process due to the use of
private and uninspected data. Therefore, FL emphasises the
impact of some classic distributed learning attacks and makes
it more challenging to prevent them.
Adversarial attacks can be carried out by the server and
the clients, since they know the parameters of the learning
process at some stage of the rounds of learning, or a third
party that accesses the model parameters shared during the
communication between server and clients. According to
Kairouz et al. [4], there are three main types of attacks:
1 Model update Poisoning Attacks [29, 30, 31]: they are
characterised by the corruption of some client model’s
update either by the client itself, a man-in-the-middle
attack or the server. For generalisation, we assume that
the adversary (or adversaries) directly controls a certain
number of clients, and they can directly change the outputs
of these clients to try to skew the global model towards
their goal. There are two types of poissoning attacks:
• Untargeted attacks: they can alter the outputs of the
FL model. The Byzantine adversarial attacks represent
the worst-case scenario, as they can make a FL model
produce any arbitrary outputs [32]. One of the most
widely used solutions proposed for this type of attack
is to employ more robust aggregation operators such
as median-based ones [33] or use data shuffling and
redundancy [34]. However, this defensive techniques
are insufficient against model update poisoning attacks
in FL [35].
• Targeted attacks: they focus on a specific target of the
adversary such as introducing a backdoor into the model
[36]. The major challenge in dealing with these attacks
is that the poisoned models are often very similar to
the rest of models. In addition, they usually preserve
the overall measures as they affect only specific cases,
which leaves the untargeted attack defences ineffective.
Existing defences against backdoor attacks [37] can not
be applied in federated environments as they require
to access to the data, which is not possible in FL and
hence and open challenge.
2 Data Poisoning Attacks: they are defined as a more
restrictive attack in which the opponent can only modify
the client’s local data by manipulating either the labels or
some features of the data. As model attacks, they are also
subdivided in untargeted [? ] and targeted [14, 38, 39]
ones. Since a data poisoning attack causes a model update
poisoning, defence mechanisms against Byzantine attacks
can be applied.
3 Evasion Attacks: they consist of manipulating a deployed
model by modifying the samples fed into it at test time
[40]. Because of the definition of the attack, white-box
model attacks are more natural and FL increases the
demand for defences against them.
Additionally, differential privacy [41] tools are an important
safeguard for the information shared during the communication
between the server and the clients. Therefore, the defensive
challenges of the FL should focus on client attacks.
We propose in this paper a defence mechanism against data
poisoning attacks by means of a FL model, which dynamically
selects the clients that are not adversarial and filters out the
adversarial ones.
III. DYNAMIC FL MODEL FOR IDENTIFYING ADVERSARIAL
CLIENTS
FL is featured by its restriction to access to the training data,
which is sequestered in the clients. Accordingly, data poisoning
attacks, and more specifically dirty-label data poisoning attacks
[9, 10], grounded in the malicious manipulation of the training
data, can corrupt the FL model, which cannot inspect the
training to defend itself against this kind of adversarial attacks.
The dirty-label poisoning adversarial attack is conducted by
the clients in a FL setting, and it consists in making subtle
modifications in the labels of the training data for corrupting
the learning process. This attack can be simulated by arbitrarily
assigning labels to all the training samples of a subset of the
federated clients. We define a dirty-label poisoning adversarial
client in Definition 3.1.
Definition 3.1 (Adversarial client): Let Ci ∈ {C1, ..., Cn} be
an arbitrary client of a FL environment whose original training
dataset is Di = 〈xli; yli〉, where xli is the sample data and yli
the label. We say that Ci is an adversarial client if it uses
the altered dataset D′i as training dataset with
D′i = 〈xli; yσ(l)i 〉,
where σ is a random permutation.
Regarding the limitation of FL to inspect the training data
for discovering adversarial clients, we propose a dynamic FL
model that dynamically selects the clients to be aggregated,
and filters out the adversarial ones. The dynamic FL model is
built upon a federated aggregation operator based on a Induced
Ordered Weighted Averaging (IOWA) operator [15], and we
call it FL-IOWA-DQ.
The IOWA operators, and more generally the Ordered
Weighted Averaging (OWA) ones [42], are functions for weight-
ing the contribution of a set of clients in a aggregation process,
as it is the aggregation of the parameters of the local learning
models in FL. We mathematically introduce OWA and IOWA
operators in Appendix A, and according to the definition the
IOWA operator is composed of (1) an order-inducing function
to set the weighting assignation order, and (2) a linguistic
quantifier to calculate the weight contribution value. We define
the induced-order function of the IOWA operator of the FL-
IOWA-DQ model in Section III-A, and the linguistic quantifier
that dynamically adapts the weighting value calculation during
the FL training in Section III-B.
A. Accuracy-based induced ordering function for FL clients
The aim of dirty-label data poisoning adversarial attacks
is hindering the performance of a FL model through altering
the labels of the training data. Since FL is grounded in the
aggregation of the LLMi, those maliciously altered ones would
perform lower than the non-altered ones. Hence, the validation
4of the LLMi before the aggregation may help to identify the
suspicious adversarial clients.
We propose the Local Accuracy Function, fLA, to measure
the performance of each LLMi before its aggregation. The
fLA function is based on the availability of a validation set
shared among the clients. The creation of this validation set
is justified by its reduced size compared to the size required
for training, and the possibility of making it up through expert
or prior knowledge. We define the fLA function in Definition
3.2.
Definition 3.2 (Local Accuracy Function (fLA)): it measures
the performance of a local learning model LLMi using a fixed
validation dataset named as V D. For that, it computes the
accuracy of LLMi over V D:
fLA(LLMi) = accuracy(LLMi, V D) (3)
where accuracy(LLMi, V D) refers to the standard accuracy
evaluation measure of the local learning model LLMi in the
dataset V D.
B. Dynamic linguistic quantifier for weighting FL clients
The non-IID data distribution of most of the FL settings
make impossible to know beforehand the nature of the clients,
and hence it is impossible to know the amount of adversarial
clients. Therefore, the selection of the FL clients by its weighted
contribution has to be dynamically calculated for adapting to
the nature of the clients.
The dynamic selection of the FL-IOWA-DQ model is based
on a IOWA linguistic quantifier that some of its parameters
values depend on the value of fLA. Before the definition of
the linguistic quantifier of FL-IOWA-DQ, we first define the
IOWA linguistic quantifier in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3 (Linguistic quantifier): It is a function Q :
[0, 1]→ [0, 1] verifying Q(0) = 0, Q(1) = 1 and Q(x) ≥ Q(y)
for x > y. Equation 4 defines how the function Q computes the
weighting values where wi represents the weighting associated
to the position i of a vector of dimension n, and Equation 5
defines the behaviour of the function Q.
w
(a,b)
i = Qa,b
(
i
n
)
−Qa,b
(
i− 1
n
)
(4)
Qa,b(x) =

0 0 ≤ x ≤ a
x− a
b− a a ≤ x ≤ b
1 b ≤ x ≤ 1
(5)
where a, b ∈ [0, 1] satisfying 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1, and they set the
intervals for calculating the contribution weight of each LLMi.
For the sake of clarification, those x values in the same interval
will have the same weighting value.
We redefine the function Qa,b for providing it a dynamic
behaviour and a higher weighting of top clients, which depends
on the fLA function. Accordingly, we propose Qa,b,c,yb that is
defined in Equations 6, and incorporates two new parameters
to the model:
1 Parameter yb. The higher weighting of top clients using
the pair (b, yb) with b, yb ∈ [0, 1] where b is the the portion
of clients we want to weight higher and yb the portion of
the total weight assigned to these clients. For example,
for the pair (b = 0.2, yb = 0.4) we distribute the 40% of
the weight among the top 20% of the best clients.
2 The dynamic behaviour of the parameter c. This parameter
represents the portion of clients that we do not discard.
For example, a value of c = 0.8 means that the 20% of
the clients will be discarded. With the aim of dynamically
adapt it, we first calculate cˆ, which is the portion of
clients which differs from the top-1 in more than 3/4 of
the maximum distance between clients according to fLA,
and set c = 1− cˆ. This way, we dynamically discard the
clients with the worst performance in terms of fLA. The
remaining weight not assigned to top clients is distributed
among the clients not discarded.
Qa,b,c,yb(x) =

0 0 ≤ x ≤ a
x− a
b− a · yb a ≤ x ≤ b
x− b
c− b · (1− yb) + yb b ≤ x ≤ c
1 c ≤ x ≤ 1
(6)
w
(a,b,c,yb)
i = Qa,b,c,yb
(
i
n
)
−Qa,b,c,yb
(
i− 1
n
)
(7)
Based on the quantifier Qa,b,c,yb and the ordering function
fLA, we define the aggregation operator of FL-IOWA-DQ as:
Definition 3.4 (IOWA Dynamic Quantifier federated aggre-
gation operator (IOWA-DQ)): The operator of dimension n
is a mapping Ψ : ([0, 1] × Ω)n → Ω with an associated set
of weights W = w(a,b,c,yb)i , and it is defined to aggregate the
second arguments of a 2-tuple n list according to the following
expression:
ΨIOWA−DQ(〈u1,Θ1〉, . . . , 〈un,Θn〉) =
n∑
i=1
w
(a,b′,c,yb)
i Θσ(i)
(8)
where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1, σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}
is a permutation function, such that uσ(i) ≥ uσ(i+1), ∀i =
{1, . . . , n−1}, ui = fLA(LLMi), b′ is the dynamic adaptation
of b (b′ = b× c), and c is the portion of clients verifying that
the distance to the highest ui obtained is less than 3/4 the
distance from the lowest ui to the highest ui. Formally, c is
the portion of clients Ci that verify
dist(uσ(1), uσ(i)) ≤ 3
4
max
i,j
dist(uσ(i), uσ(j)) (9)
Since we apply it to the aggregation of FL models, Θi
represents the model’s parameters of the client i but it could
be applied in other contexts.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
We evaluate the FL-IOWA-DQ model through setting up
a FL environment with the Sherpa.ai FL framework3 [43].
3https://github.com/sherpaai/Sherpa.ai-Federated-Learning-Framework
5Likewise we compare it with the static versions of FL-IOWA-
DQ and other federated aggregation operators from the state
of the art such as FedAvg [11].
The evaluation of FL-IOWA-DQ is performed in two datasets
arranged for FL, and we describe them in Section IV-A. Also,
we deployed an image classification deep learning model in the
FL setting, which is described in Section IV-B. Section IV-C
specifies the different configurations of the dynamic FL model.
Finally, the federated aggregation operators used as baselines
are introduced in Section IV-D.
A. Evaluation datasets
We use two different datasets for the evaluation of the FL-
IOWA-DQ model. Since the FL-IOWA-DQ model needs a
validation set for dynamically discarding adversarial clients,
we create it from the training subsets of the two datasets, which
follows the same distribution of the training subsets and has
the same size than the test subsets. The two datasets used in
the evaluation are described as what follows:
1 The EMNIST (Extended Modified NIST) dataset, which
was presented in 2017 in [16] as an extension of the
MNIST dataset [44]. The EMNIST Digits class contains
a balanced subset of the digits dataset containing 28,000
samples of each digit. The dataset consists of 280,000
samples, which 240,000 are training samples and 40,000
test samples.
2 The Fashion MNIST [17] aims to be a more challenging
replacement for the original MNSIT dataset. It contains
a balanced subset of the 10 different classes containing
7,000 samples of each class. Hence, the dataset consists
of 70,000 samples, which 60,000 are training samples and
10,000 test samples.
In summary, the datasets, after appropriate modifications to
prepare the validation sets, follow the data distributions shown
in Table I.
TABLE I
SIZE OF THE TRAINING, VALIDATION AND TEST SETS OF EMNIST AND
FASHION MNIST DATASETS.
Training Validation Test
EMNIST 200,000 40,000 40,000
Fashion MNIST 50,000 10,000 10,000
With the aim of adapting the datasets to a federated
environment, the training data is distributed among the clients
following a non-IID distribution. Accordingly, we randomly
assign instances of a reduced number of labels to each client
simulating a scenario in which each client contains partial
information.
B. Deep Learning model for image classification
We use a deep learning model as local learning models
LLMi and global learning model for FL with n clients.
Accordingly, the matrix from the FL definition Θ ∈ Ω =
Rn×Rd1×Rd2 where d1 is the number of layers of the neural
network and d2 the maximum dimension of layer weights.
Since we evaluate our proposal on a image classification task,
we developed an image classification deep learning model
based on a convolutional neural network (CNN), which is
similar to the proposed in [11].
The deep learning model is designed with two convolutional
layers with kernel size 5×5 and output size of 32 and 64 units
respectively. Both layers are followed by a max-pooling layer
with a 2× 2 filter and stride = 2. Then, we add a dense layer
with 512 hidden units and ReLU as activation function. The
output layer is a softmax layer. The training is driven by the
cross-entropy function. Equation 10 sums up the deep learning
classification model.
Softmax(y7) = pred
ReLU(y67×7×64) = y7
Dropout(y57×7×64, dr
2) = y67×7×64
MaxPooling(y414×14×64) = y
5
7×7×64
CNN2(y314×14×32) = y
4
14×14×64
Dropout(y214×14×32, dr
1) = y314×14×32
MaxPooling(y128×28×32) = y
2
14×14×32
CNN1(D28×28) = y128×28×32
(10)
where dr1 and dr2 are the dropout rate of the first and
second dropout layers respectively.
C. Dynamic FL models
The parametric and dynamic definition of the FL-IOWA-
DQ model allows to use it with different configurations. We
evaluate two different configurations according to the weighting
of top clients by means of yb. The parameters of FL-IOWA-DQ
in both configuration are the following ones:
1 We set a = 0 in order to take into account all the best
clients.
2 We fix b = 0.2 × c to assign the highest weight to the
best 20% of the clients involved in the aggregation.
3 We use two different values for the top weighting
parameter yb = {0.4, 0.75} resulting in two different
configurations.
Based on these parameters, we define the two configurations
of the FL-IOWA-DQ in Table II. Figure 1 shows the IOWA-
DQ-0.4 linguistic quantifier as fuzzy sets.
TABLE II
VALUE OF THE PARAMETERS FOR EACH CONFIGURATION OF THE DYNAMIC
FL MODELS BASED ON IOWA OPERATORS.
a b c yb
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.4 0 0.2 × c dynamic 0.4
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.75 0 0.2 × c dynamic 0.75
D. FL baselines based on federated aggregation operators
We compare the FL models specified above with the
following FL models as baselines. For all of them, we use the
same deep learning models. Hence, the difference in behaviour
60.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c=0.7
c=0.8
c=0.9
Fig. 1. Linguistic quantifier of IOWA-DQ-0.4.
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Fig. 2. Linguistic quantifier of AL-80.
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x
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Q
(x
)
Fig. 3. Linguistic quantifier of IOWA-SQ-0.4.
will be due to the federated aggregation operator. Likewise,
we define the aggregation operator and name the associated
FL model as FL-[operator].
1) FL-FedAvg: The corresponding aggregation operator
builds the federated model by means the average of local
models. It is the most used federated aggregation operator in
the literature. We formally define it in Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.1 (Federated Averaging (FedAvg) [11]): The
FedAvg aggregation operator of dimension n is a mapping
FedAvg : Ωn → Ω defined to aggregate a list of parameters
{Θ1, . . . ,Θn} according to the following expression:
FedAvg(Θ1, . . . ,Θn) =
∑n
i Θi
n
(11)
2) FL-W-FedAvg: We also consider the weighted version of
FL-FedAvg based on the amount of data for each client. We
formally define it in Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.2 (Weighted Federated Averaging (W-FedAvg)
[11]): The W-FedAvg aggregation operator of dimension n
is a mapping W − FedAvg : Ωn → Ω defined to aggregate
a list of parameters {Θ1, . . . ,Θn} according to the following
expression:
W − FedAvg(Θ1, . . . ,Θn) =
n∑
i
Θi
ni
(12)
where ni represents the amount of data of client i.
3) FL-AL-80: With the aim of defining this FL model, we
extend the “at least half” IOWA operator [45] to “at least 80%”
aggregation operator, which is defined in Definition 4.3.
Definition 4.3 (IOWA At Least 80% (AL-80)): The IOWA AL-
80 operator of dimension n is a mapping Ψ : ([0, 1]×Ω)n → Ω
which has an associated set of weights W = w(0,0.8)i and it is
defined to aggregate the second arguments of a 2-tuple n list
according to the following expression:
ΨAL−80(〈u1,Θ1〉, . . . , 〈un,Θn〉) =
n∑
i=1
w
(0,0.8)
i Θσ(i) (13)
being σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} a permutation function
such that uσ(i) ≥ uσ(i+1), ∀i = {1, . . . , n − 1} and ui =
fLA(LLMi).
Figure 2 shows the AL-80 linguistic quantifier as a fuzzy
set.
TABLE III
VALUE OF THE PARAMETERS FOR EACH CONFIGURATION OF THE STATIC FL
MODELS BASED ON IOWA OPERATORS.
a b c yb
IOWA-SQ-0.4 0 0.2 0.8 0.4
IOWA-SQ-0.75 0 0.2 0.8 0.75
4) FL-IOWA-SQ: For the sake of evaluating the dynamic
behaviour of FL-IOWA-DQ, we also present its static version
which differs from the dynamic version in a manual assignment
of the value c. Let us mathematically define IOWA-SQ in
Definition 4.4.
Definition 4.4 (IOWA Static Quantifier aggregation operator
(IOWA-SQ)): The IOWA-SQ operator of dimension n is a
mapping Ψ : ([0, 1] × Ω)n → Ω which has an associated set
of weights W = w(a,b,c,yb)i and it is defined to aggregate the
second arguments of a 2-tuple n list according to the following
expression:
ΨIOWA−SQ(〈u1,Θ1〉, . . . , 〈un,Θn〉) =
n∑
i=1
w
(a,b,c,yb)
i Θσ(i)
(14)
where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1, σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}
is a permutation function, such that uσ(i) ≥ uσ(i+1), ∀i =
{1, . . . , n− 1} and ui = fLA(LLMi).
Analogously to dynamic FL models, we define two different
configurations of the static FL model in Table III depending
on the top clients weighting parameter yb.
Figure 3 shows the IOWA-SQ-0.4 linguistic quantifier as a
fuzzy set.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of FL-IOWA-DQ in different
scenarios, in order to compare its performance with other
federated aggregation operators, and to evaluate its capacity
of dynamically discarding adversarial clients and reducing the
number of rounds of learning. The evaluation scenarios are
described as what follows:
• AD Scenario: we asses its ability to detect adversarial
clients and enhance the performance of the FL model in a
scenario with a fixed percentage of them in Section V-A.
We study if the filtered out clients are only the adversarial
ones.
7Fig. 4. Adversarial clients detected in AD Scenario with 20 clients. Fig. 5. Adversarial clients detected in AD Scenario with 50 clients.
• NON-AD Scenario: we also evaluate in Section V-B the
FL-IOWA-DQ model in a scenario without adversarial
clients, in order to study if it can discard clients with a
low performance, and if this results in a enhancement of
the performance of the FL model.
• High-AD Scenario: we show the significance of the
dynamic character of the proposed FL model by increasing
the number of adversarial clients in Section V-C, which
should be more detrimental to the rest of the FL models.
• Rounds of learning: we analyse the reduction of the
number of rounds of learning(see Section V-D) when using
the dynamic FL model, which reduces the communication
that is one of the main FL handicaps.
In every experimental scenario, the training of the FL models
is performed in 10 rounds of learning of the clients. Each client
runs 5 training epochs in each round following a mini-batch
based training. The evaluation performance was conducted
using the data from the EMNIST and Fashion MNIST test
datasets and we use accuracy as evaluation measure. We
performed 10 runs of each experiment and the result shown
is the average of the results obtained in the 10 runs. In each
scenario we carry out experiments with 20 and 50 clients to
take into account different situations.
A. AD Scenario - With adversarial clients
In this scenario, we consider the non-IID partition of the
training data and turn into adversarial clients 10% of the clients,
i.e. 2 and 5 adversarial clients respectively.
Table IV shows the results obtained by each FL model. In
this case, the superiority of the IOWA-based FL models is
evident with respect to the baselines. We highlight its capacity
of not considering in the aggregation those clients with a low
performance, which are in this case adversarial clients with
the intention of manipulating the global FL model.
Concerning the IOWA-based FL models, it is hereby con-
firmed that dynamic FL models are the ones that reached the
highest results, because of the following two reasons:
• The scaled weighting in favour of those clients in the
top 20% in accuracy. This factor is confirmed to be
advantageous because static IOWA-based FL models get
better results than FL-AL-80.
• The dynamic adaptation to the number of adversarial
clients in each scenario.
The value yb may depend on the problem, but a higher value
seems to be the best option, because we assign more weight
to the top clients.
Identificacion of adversarial clients: Figures 4 and 5 show
the number of adversarial clients discarded by each FL-IOWA-
based model in each round of federated training in the AD
scenario with 20 and 50 clients of which 10% are adversarial
clients, i.e. two and five clients. Since the parameter yb does not
influence this identification, we show the results with yb = 0.75.
The number of clients that are not considered by the static FL
model (FL-IOWA-SQ-0.75) is constantly 20% of the clients,
i.e. 4 and 10 clients. In contrast, dynamic FL model FL-IOWA-
DQ-0.4 has a more flexible behaviour. It begins identifying too
much adversarial clients (nearly 50%) because some clients
with complex training data get poor performance in first rounds.
Then, the number of adversarial clients progressively decreases
because these clients with complex data improve its accuracy
benefited by the rest of the clients. Finally, at the 4th round in
both 20 and 50 clients scenario respectively, FL-IOWA-DQ-
0.75 succeeds in identifying only and exclusively the adversarial
clients. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of FL-IOWA-DQ-
0.75 is positive for improving the global performance of the
model, and for only identifying adversarial clients.
TABLE IV
ACCURACY OF FL MODELS IN THE AD SCENARIO.
EMNIST Fashion-MNIST
20 clients 50 clients 20 clients 50 clients
FL-FedAvg 0.9826 0.9791 0.8661 0.8439
FL-W-FedAvg 0.9776 0.9774 0.8699 0.8321
FL-AL-80 0.9832 0.9803 0.8708 0.8469
FL-IOWA-SQ-0.4 0.9863 0.9824 0.8747 0.8541
FL-IOWA-SQ-0.75 0.9883 0.9869 0.8656 0.8671
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.4 0.9870 0.9886 0.8782 0.8694
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.75 0.9900 0.9898 0.8680 0.8729
8B. NON-AD Scenario - Without adversarial clients
In this scenario, we consider the non-IID partition of the
training data without any adversarial clients, in order to analyse
the existence of clients with a poor distribution of the data.
Table V shows the results reached by each FL model. According
to the results, we conclude:
• Every proposed FL-IOWA-based model performs better
than the ones presented in the literature.
• Among the FL-IOWA-based models, the dynamics FL
models also show a subtle superiority.
• Comparing between dynamic FL models based on the
value yb, in most of the cases the dynamic FL model that
assigns more weight to the top 20% clients (FL-IOWA-DQ-
0.75) has achieved the best performance, which highlights
the impact of this higher weighting on the best clients.
TABLE V
ACCURACY OF FL MODELS IN THE NON-AD SCENARIO.
EMNIST Fashion-MNIST
20 clients 50 clients 20 clients 50 clients
FL-FedAvg 0.9864 0.9801 0.8704 0.8452
FL-W-FedAvg 0.9857 0.9769 0.8721 0.8396
FL-AL-80 0.9861 0.9807 0.8772 0.8492
FL-IOWA-SQ-0.4 0.9882 0.9836 0.8793 0.8547
FL-IOWA-SQ-0.75 0.9890 0.9868 0.8726 0.8673
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.4 0.9891 0.9848 0.8953 0.8684
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.75 0.9893 0.9873 0.8923 0.8728
Although there are not adversarial clients, the results show
the relevance of weighting the contribution of each client to
the FL model according to their performance. That is because
it is very likely that there would be clients with a poor data
distribution.
We stress out that dynamic FL models reached better results
in AD Scenario than in NON-AD Scenario when EMNIST
dataset. This further highlights the benefit to the global learning
model of discarding the clients that contribute the least in the
aggregation, whether they are poor clients or adversarial ones.
C. High-AD Scenario - Increasing the number of adversarial
clients
We evaluated the FL models with a predefined number of
adversarial clients in the AD-Scenario, but what would be the
performance of the IOWA-based FL models in a scenario with
more adversarial clients?
Regarding the previous question, we repeated the evaluation
of AD scenario with 30% of adversarial clients, i.e. 6 and 15
adversarial clients. Table VI shows the results obtained in terms
of the accuracy obtained with 30% adversarial clients. We stress
out the significance of the dynamic aspect of the proposed
dynamic FL models. While static FL models significantly
reduce their performance because it uses adversarial clients in
the aggregation, dynamic FL models preserve their performance
and even improve the results of the AD scenario with 10%
of adversarial clients in some cases. This shows the ability of
the FL-IOWA-DQ model to adapt to real scenarios where the
number and nature of adversarial clients is unknown.
TABLE VI
ACCURACY OF FL MODELS IN THE SCENARIO WITH 30% OF ADVERSARIAL
CLIENTS. WE ALSO SHOW THE DIFFERENCE WITH THE ACCURACY
REACHED IN TABLE IV IN ORDER TO COMPARE THE GAIN OR LOSS OF
ACCURACY WHEN THE NUMBER OF ADVERSARIAL CLIENTS INCREASED.
EMNIST Fashion-MNIST
20 clients 50 clients 20 clients 50 clients
FL-FedAvg 0.9788 0.9753 0.8451 0.8435
FL-W-FedAvg 0.9769 0.9758 0.8456 0.8228
FL-AL-80 0.9713 0.9781 0.8439 0.8212
FL-IOWA-SQ-0.4 0.9826 0.9820 0.8468 0.8539
FL-IOWA-SQ-0.75 0.9844 0.9861 0.8518 0.8604
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.4 0.9876 0.9860 0.8648 0.8610
FL-IOWA-DQ-0.75 0.9873 0.9874 0.8722 0.8684
Fig. 6. Accuracy per round of FL models using 20 clients without adversarial
clients (NON-AD Scenario) during the first 5 rounds.
D. Analysis of the number of updates
One of the major FL handicaps is the time spent in
communications between server and client. For that reason,
the reduction of the communication among the server and the
clients is crucial in FL. The communication may be reduced
by the limitation of the model updates or training rounds, or
reducing the amount of information share among the server
and the client. In this section we focus on the reduction of the
number of training rounds, in order to lessen the number
of model updates. In this section, we study the speed of
convergence of the IOWA-based FL models, in the sense of
the number or training rounds needed to reach good results.
We analyse the accuracy per round achieved in NON-AD
Scenario with 20 agents during the first 5 rounds. Figure 6
shows the performance reached by each FL model.
Figure 6 shows that the FL-IOWA-based models allow to
reach good results with less training rounds than the FL-FedAvg
and FL-W-FedAvg. Specifically, FL-IOWA-DQ-0.75 is the FL
model that reaches better results since the first training rounds.
We stress out the leading of FL-IOWA-DQ-0.75 since the
1st round. Therefore, the dynamic selection of the clients to
aggregate allows to reduce the number of updates among the
server and the clients, and hence the number of communication
rounds.
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In this paper, we propose the dynamic FL model FL-IOWA-
DQ, which is built upon a federated aggregation operator based
on an IOWA operator and has the capacity of dynamically
selecting clients according to its performance to filter out
adversarial clients. We evaluated the FL-IOWA-DQ model
on the EMNIST and Fashion MNIST image classification
benchamrks. We designed different evaluation scenarios, the
first type with adversarial clients (AD and High-AD Scenario)
and the second type without adversarial ones (NON-AD
Scenario). The results of the experiments and the subsequent
qualitative analysis show:
1 The FL-IOWA-DQ model outperformed FL-FedAvg and
FL-W-FedAvg, as well as the static versions of FL-IOWA-
DQ in both scenarios.
2 It is able to only filter out adversarial clients.
3 It has the capacity of reaching a higher quality training
model in less training rounds, hence it reduces the number
of training rounds and communication updates among the
federated server and the clients.
4 Its dynamic nature also allows to reach higher results
when the number of adversarial clients is larger than the
assumed by the static version of the FL-IOWA-DQ model.
Therefore, we show that the dynamic selection of the clients
to be aggregated conducted by FL-IOWA-DQ enhances the
performance of the FL model, allow to defend against data
poisoning attacks and also reduce the number of rounds of
learning needed to converge, which means that our claim holds.
As future work, we plan to deepen in the analysis of the
adversarial attacks taxonomy with the purpose of proposing
aggregation operators that defend the FL model against more
complex attacks. In this way, we will focus on sybil attacks
[46] which, our point of view, are the most challenging attacks
due to the coordination between clients.
APPENDIX
ORDERED WEIGHTED MODEL AVERAGING
Group decision making is the AI task focused on finding
out a consensus decision from a set of experts by summing
up their individual evaluations. Yager proposed in [42] the
Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators with the aim of
modelling the fuzzy opinion majority [45] in group decision
making. Yager and Filev generalised the OWA operator
definition in [15], where they defined the OWA operator with
an order-induced vector for ordering the argument variable.
They called this generalisation of OWA operators with a
specific semantic in the aggregation process as Induced Ordered
Weighted Averaging (IOWA). The OWA and IOWA operators
are weighted aggregation functions that are mathematically
defined as what follows:
Definition A.1 (OWA Operator [42]): An OWA operator of
dimension n is a function Φ : Rn → R that has an associated
set of weights or weighting vector W = (w1, . . . , wn) so that
wi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑n
i=1 wi = 1, and it is defined to aggregate a
list of real values {c1, . . . , cn} according to the Equation 15:
Φ(c1, . . . , cn) =
n∑
i=1
wicσ(i) (15)
being σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} a permutation function
such that cσ(i) ≥ cσ(i+1), ∀i = {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Definition A.2 (IOWA Operator [15]): An IOWA operator
of dimension n is a mapping Ψ : (R×R)n → R which has an
associated set of weights W = (w1, . . . , wn) so that wi ∈ [0, 1]
and
∑n
i=1 wi = 1, and it is defined to aggregate the second
arguments of a 2-tuple list {〈u1, c1〉, . . . , 〈un, cn〉} according
to the following expression:
Ψ(〈u1, c1〉, . . . , 〈un, cn〉) =
n∑
i=1
wicσ(i) (16)
being σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} a permutation function
such that uσ(i) ≥ uσ(i+1), ∀i = {1, . . . , n− 1}. The vector of
values U = (u1, . . . , un) is called the order-inducing vector
and (c1, . . . , cn) the values of the argument variable.
The OWA and IOWA operators are functions for weighting
the contribution of experts for the global decision in the case of
group decision making, and the contribution of a set of clients
in an aggregation process in a general scenario. However,
they need an additional function to calculate the values of the
parameters, which in the context of group decision making
means the grade of membership to a fuzzy concept. The weight
value calculation function is known as linguistic quantifier
[47], which is defined as a function Q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such as
Q(0) = 0, Q(1) = 1 and Q(x) ≥ Q(y) for x > y. Equation
17 defines how the function Q computes the weight values and
Equation 18 defines the behaviour of the function Q.
w
(a,b)
i = Qa,b
(
i
n
)
−Qa,b
(
i− 1
n
)
(17)
Qa,b(x) =

0 0 ≤ x ≤ a
x− a
b− a a ≤ x ≤ b
1 b ≤ x ≤ 1
(18)
where a, b ∈ [0, 1] satisfying 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1.
The function Q in Equation 18 can be redefined in order
to model different linguistic quantifiers. Since the definition
of the notion quantifier guided aggregation [42, 47], other
definitions of the function Q has been proposed to model
different linguistic quantifiers like “most” or “at least” [45].
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